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Life in the European Union has changed 
since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. 
While life satisfaction continues to be rated 
highly, the crisis nevertheless has affected a 
great proportion of the European population. 
It has left millions of people unemployed, and 
in several countries youth unemployment is 
so high that the many young Europeans who 
are now out of work are already being referred 
to as a ‘lost generation’. For those in work, 
conditions are also worsening: the pattern 
is one of less work, reduced overall working 
time, less overtime, rising job insecurity, less 
choice for workers, wage freezes and wage 
cuts. The crisis has widened inequalities 
not just between people but also between 
countries, with increasing differences in 
quality of life evident in the EU. With the 
burden of debt expected to last for years 
to come, the social and economic costs of 
unemployment, poverty and social exclusion 
are borne by society at large and by the EU 
as a whole. 
In trying to emerge from the crisis and return 
to pre-crisis levels of growth and employment, 
national governments have been confronted 
with the challenge of having to address public 
debt and budget imbalances without losing 
sight of the well-being and social protection of 
their citizens. The EU’s challenge is to ensure 
that recovery is shaped in a way that brings 
Europe back on the path of smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth, as expressed in the 
Europe 2020 strategy. In addition to policy 
efforts to stabilise financial markets, foster 
economic growth and tackle the fast-rising rate 
of unemployment among young Europeans, 
the European Commission launched the 
Social Investment Package in 2013 as the EU’s 
social policy response to the crisis (European 
Commission, 2013a). 
As part of the package, the Commission 
calls for well-designed welfare systems that 
combine social investment with protection 
and stabilisation to increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of social policies, while ensuring 
continued support for a fairer and more 
inclusive society. To enable people to actively 
participate to the best of their abilities in 
society and the economy, activation measures 
are given a more prominent role, and the case 
is made that support should be better targeted 
at those in need when they need it (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 3). 
It will take time to see the effect of those measures, 
but meanwhile the debate on what will happen 
to European integration and the future of the 
European project cannot be postponed. In times of 
economic downturn, trust in political institutions 
weakens as citizens become disenchanted with 
the political system. Unemployment appears 
to have had a stronger negative impact on trust 
of national governments than on trust of EU 
 Policy context
institutions – at least in the EU151 countries 
(Roth et al, 2011) – but the EU as a supranational 
collective of sovereign states faces the additional 
challenge of increased nationalism and support 
for protectionism within those states.
Throughout its history, the EU has relied on 
dialogue with its stakeholders to ensure that 
the Union is built on cooperation. In light of 
decreasing trust levels, and to ensure that 
citizens are directly included in the debate on 
Europe’s future, the designation of 2013 as the 
European Year of Citizens is a timely endeavour. 
To quote Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the 
European Commission, ‘We cannot build the 
European Union without citizens, we can only 
build the EU with the people it is made for and 
based on their ideas’ (European Commission, 
2013b, p. 1). Clearly, the aim of the European 
Year is not only to engage with the public and 
to talk about what has been achieved so far and 
where the EU should be in 10 years’ time, but 
also to discuss how to continue strengthening 
the legitimacy of the EU. And to ensure this 
legitimacy, citizens must know that their voice 
counts in the EU. To promote awareness and to 
tackle political disenchantment, the European 
Year seeks to highlight the European dimension 
by raising awareness of the rights of EU citizens 
and the positive developments relating to those 
rights to date. 
The focus of the European Year is even timelier 
considering that, in June 2014, EU citizens 
will elect a new European Parliament. Trusting 
citizens are important for voter turnout. Turnout 
at the 2009 elections was the lowest ever (43%), 
but the concern is that it will be even lower this 
time around. 
Policy challenges and issues
This policy brief examines the challenges 
that the EU faces when it comes to trust and 
civic engagement during the crisis. The first 
issue is the problem of increased political 
disenchantment during a difficult economic 
time. Political disenchantment is a complex 
issue that has several dimensions and that 
varies between countries and between different 
groups of Europeans. As will be highlighted 
in this paper, the EU is not, as portrayed in a 
recent paper from the Pew Research Center 
(2013), the only ‘sick man of Europe’; the crisis 
in confidence affects national governments 
just as much, if not more. However, the risk 
for Europe is that it is blamed solely by some 
politicians and media for the problems that 
the economic crisis has created for European 
citizens. Thus the first challenge for the EU is 
to raise awareness of what it does and convince 
citizens that its institutions are trustworthy.
The second issue concerns efforts to let 
Europeans know that their voice counts in the 
EU. The ability of Europeans to participate 
in the decision-making process goes beyond 
traditional mechanisms. In addition to 
democratic elections held every four years, 
European citizens have for many years had the 
right to petition the European Parliament on 
issues that come within the scope of the Union’s 
activities. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty 
established the right for citizens to help set the 
EU agenda and influence EU policy through 
the European citizens’ initiative. By calling 
upon the European Commission to make a 
legislative proposal, this form of direct political 
participation allows EU citizens to have a say 
in the development of EU policies. Awareness 
of this right is on the rise – Flash Eurobarometer 
365 from November 2012 showed that 73% 
of Europeans knew of their right to launch 
citizens’ initiatives, up from 68% in March 2010 
(European Commission, 2013d). However, only 
14 such initiatives have been set up so far.2 
The third issue is the relationship between 
trust and forms of active participation such as 
volunteering. A recent study shows that people 
encounter well-functioning institutions through 
volunteering (in fields where public sector 
and voluntary organisations have common 
interests), and that this experience increases 
their institutional trust (Sivesind et al, 2013). 
This paper, therefore, also looks at the extent 
to which Europeans volunteer and what 
opportunities exist to boost citizen participation, 
including voting, increased awareness, self-
expression and volunteering.
4
1 The 15 EU Member States prior to enlargement in 2004.
2 For more information on the European citizens’ initiative, see http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome.
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Key findings
Î In most countries trust in both national and European political institutions has eroded 
substantially since the onset of the economic crisis.
Î On average in Europe, trust in the EU used to be at a considerably higher level than trust in 
the national government or parliament. In recent years, this ‘surplus’ of trust diminished to an 
unprecedented low of 34% in November 2011.
Î National differences in trust patterns between countries exist, but individuals tend to exhibit 
congruence in trust levels: they either tend to trust both the EU and the national institutions, 
or tend to lack trust in both. This requires policy actions that address trust both at the national 
and supranational level. 
Î While the rates of traditional forms of participation (such as attending a meeting or contacting 
a politician) are decreasing the new online forms of political expression, such as electronic 
petitions, are on the rise. This confirms the relevance of an existing European citizens’ initiative, 
and points to a need for further development of the potential for citizen involvement.
Î Trust in institutions is positively related to satisfaction with the economic situation in one’s 
country and negatively related to perceived corruption, yet it is most strongly related to citizen 
satisfaction with the quality of public services. This should direct research towards a more 
thorough as a well as broader monitoring of institutional performance. 
Î The future dynamics of trust in national and European political institutions may be affected 
by how successful EU policy packages are in promoting public service delivery, as well as 
institutional performance more generally, in ways that are appreciated by the public. 
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Ë Section  Expl ring the issue
Dynamics of political trust during 
the crisis
This overview of empirical evidence draws on 
the following cross-sectional European surveys.
• Eurobarometer: This is the European 
Commission’s public opinion-monitoring 
tool and covers a wide variety of topical 
issues relating to the EU and its policies. The 
Eurobarometer consistently monitors levels 
of political trust by asking EU citizens if they 
tend to trust or not to trust certain institutions.3 
• European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS): 
The EQLS explores issues pertinent to the 
quality of life of European citizens, including 
trust in public institutions and civic 
participation. The EQLS is an increasingly 
important contribution by Eurofound to the 
policy and academic debate.4 
• European Social Survey (ESS): The ESS 
is an academically driven social survey 
designed to chart and explain the interaction 
between Europe’s changing institutions and 
the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns 
of its diverse populations.5 
Falling trust levels
There has been an overall downward trend among 
Europeans regarding the extent to which they 
trust national governments, national parliaments 
and the EU since 2009 (Figure 1). While trust 
in the EU was and remains higher than trust in 
national institutions, its decline is more persistent 
over time and has come closer to the level of trust 
in national institutions than ever before.
Although the EU still has larger credits of trust 
than national institutions – on average, 34% of 
EU citizens trust the EU, compared with 24% 
who trust their national government – this is 
not the case everywhere. In Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK, citizens are less likely to 
trust the EU than their national institutions. 
However, even before the crisis, some of these 
countries had large Eurosceptic populations. 
At the same time, there are many countries 
where the EU is still more widely trusted than 
the national government. This includes the 
countries hardest hit by the crisis; for instance, 
in Greece 29% trust the EU compared with 8% 
who trust the national government. 
3 More information about the Eurobarometer can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
4 For more information about the EQLS, see http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/eqls/index.htm
5 More information about the ESS can be found at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
The EQLS shows that trust in the national 
government fell significantly between 2007 and 
2011 in 20 of the 27 Member States6, with the 
largest drops in average trust levels recorded in 
Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain 
(see the annex for details).7 Only in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Latvia and Sweden does the survey 
point to significant increases in trust, although the 
magnitude of the increase is much smaller than 
the decreases in trust recorded in countries like 
Greece and Spain. The Eurobarometer, although 
it uses a different question and answer scale,8 
shows a similar picture, with significant drops 
in the proportion of respondents trusting their 
national government in 24 of the 27  Member 
States between 2007 and 2011, with the largest 
declines noted in Cyprus, Greece and Spain. 
Regardless of whether the national institutions 
or the EU is trusted more, the direction of 
change – in most cases, diminishing trust – 
seems to take place in parallel. Evidence of this 
type is provided by the ESS, which measures 
trust in national parliaments and in the 
European Parliament in 18 Member States of 
the EU (see Figure 2). 
8
Figure 1: Percentage of Europeans who trust their national parliament, national 
government and the EU, 2004–2011 (%)
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6 The EU comprised 27 Member States at the time of analysis; Croatia was a candidate country at the time.
7 EQLS Q28 asks ‘Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 
10, where 1 means that you do not trust at all, and 10 means that you trust completely?’ a. The [nationality] parliament, e. The 
government
8 Eurobarometer 76 QA10 asks ‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each 
of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?’ 6. The [nationality] Government, 7. The 
[nationality parliament], 8. The European Union.
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The 2006 and 2010 ESS show that in most 
instances declines in trust affected both 
the national parliament and the European 
Parliament. Equally, in the two countries where 
trust in the national parliament increased 
(Ireland and Bulgaria) or remained stable 
(Estonia and Cyprus), a similar development is 
observed for the European Parliament.9
In summary, the evidence from all three surveys 
is that in most countries trust in political 
institutions is eroding. However, since the figures 
point to faltering trust in political institutions in 
general, rather than singling out the European 
Union, the more sensible response would seem 
to seek appropriate policy action to restore trust 
both at the national and supranational level. 
Which groups of Europeans require 
particular attention?
Economic recession generates widespread 
anxiety even among individuals who do 
not experience economic hardship directly 
(Polavieja, 2013). Yet, policy responses are most 
needed to address those groups of Europeans 
who are most likely to lack trust. 
One consequence of the crisis is that the 
number of people facing economic hardship 
has increased considerably since 2007, adding 
further pressure on governments to retain the 
confidence of their electorate (Figure  3). The 
EQLS shows that trust in national governments 
is particularly low among Europeans living in 
financially precarious situations (Figure 4).
Distrust in the EU is also particularly widespread 
among Europeans living in precarious financial 
situations. Eurobarometer 76 shows that 65% 
of people who report having difficulties paying 
bills most of the time say they tend not to trust 
the European Union, an opinion that is shared 
by 61% of unemployed Europeans (European 
Commission, 2011). The propensity to distrust 
Figure 2: Level of trust in national parliaments and the European Parliament, 
selected EU Member States, 2006 and 2010
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9 The ESS asks ‘Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read 
out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.’ B4 [country’s] parliament, B9 the 
European Parliament. 
the EU is equally high among Europeans who 
feel they don’t know how the EU works and those 
who feel that their voice doesn’t count (63% and 
64%, respectively, lack trust in the EU).
Which groups of Europeans require 
particular attention?
Muñoz et al (2011) have analysed the 
relationship between trust in national and 
European parliaments by testing the hypotheses 
of congruence versus compensation. ESS data 
indicates that in countries where the governance 
quality of national institutions is lower, trust in 
the European Parliament is higher – in this way, 
the EU institutions are expected to ‘compensate’ 
for shortcomings in the national political 
context. In a small number of countries, where 
the quality of governance as well as trust in 
national institutions is at relatively high levels, 
the European Parliament is trusted less than 
its national equivalent. However, at individual 
level, support for the national parliament 
and support for the European Parliament are 
positively related, or congruent. It is worth 
noting, however, that this study was based on 
pre-crisis survey data. 
Further examination of the interaction between 
national and the European levels of trust 
in institutions by Arnold et al (2012) using 
Eurobarometer data from 2005 to 2010 by and 
large confirmed the findings of congruence at 
individual country level and compensation when 
country differences in governance are accounted 
for. However, their results also point out that 
more thorough research is needed to better 
account for the impact of various components of 
the quality of national governance.
By examining the data further, this study 
proposes that new factors are possibly shaping 
trust in national and European political 
institutions. These are: 
• the debates surrounding the measures to 
tackle the crisis, mainly the problems of 
national public debt and the role of the EU 
in this process; 
• the overall performance of a broad set 
of public institutions – not solely the 
parliament or government.
One specific effect of the crisis on political 
trust is related to the increased attention of 
10
Figure 3: Percentage of Europeans facing economic hardship, EU27, 2007 and 2011
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the public to the changing economic climate 
and its extensive impact. As already noted, 
unemployment and the ratio of public debt to 
GDP were key factors related to declining trust 
in national parliaments and governments in the 
EU15 in the period of crisis (Roth et al, 2011). 
Further research to will shed light on how EU 
involvement in public debt management (via 
the European Central Bank) affected political 
trust: whether and where the EU gained more 
trust in compensation for the troubled national 
institutions, and whether and where there was 
just a ‘congruent’ downward trend in trust 
levels (as simple descriptive statistics suggest). 
National differences in perceptions of the crisis 
and the role of the EU in tackling it may require 
new approaches to research on trust in political 
institutions since ‘Eurosceptical mindsets … 
have become more pronounced in all of the 
member countries during the crisis, albeit in 
each country for different and rather polarizing 
reasons’ (Habermas, 2013, p. 2).
A more extensive analysis of the EQLS 
has found that the quality of governance 
influences average trust in national public 
institutions (parliament, government, legal 
system and police) in Europe insofar that trust 
is negatively affected by perceived corruption 
(Eurofound, 2013). In addition, as Muñoz et 
al (2011) claimed, trust is positively affected 
by satisfaction with the economic situation in 
one’s country, reinforcing the findings of the 
econometric analysis by Roth et al (2011). 
However, the biggest effect comes from citizen 
satisfaction with the quality of public services. 
Measured on a scale of 1 to 10, the average trust 
in national institutions in the EU27 is 4.85, but 
a 1-point increase in satisfaction with public 
services raises the trust in those institutions 
from 4.85 to 5.22 (Figure 5). This importance of 
public services should direct research towards 
a more thorough as well as broader monitoring 
of institutional performance. The future 
dynamics of trust in national and European 
political institutions may be affected by how 
successful EU policy packages are in promoting 
public service delivery, as well as institutional 
performance more generally, in ways that are 
appreciated by the public. 
Figure 4: Levels of trust in national governments, by socioeconomic circumstance, 
EU27, 2007 and 2011
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Towards rebuilding trust in 
Europe’s political institutions 
Boosting awareness
In a recent comparative analysis of the 
relationship between political trust and forms 
of political participation in Europe, it was 
found that voter participation is boosted not 
only by political trust but by a combination 
of trust and awareness (Hooghe and Marien, 
2013). Europeans consistently voice interest in 
receiving more information about the EU, and 
there is broad agreement among the European 
electorate that turnout at European elections 
would be higher if more information were 
provided about the elections, the impact of 
the EU on their daily life, and the programmes 
and objectives of candidates and parties in the 
European Parliament (European Commission, 
2013c).
Figure 5: Determinants of trust in national public institutions, EU27
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Source: EQLS, 2011 (see Eurofound, 2013)
Yet, despite concerted efforts from the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, 
awareness of EU issues remains low. What is 
even more disconcerting in this context is the 
persistent feeling that one’s voice does not count 
in the EU. As was noted for trust, economically 
vulnerable Europeans are most negative in this 
regard: the view that one’s voice doesn’t count is 
held by 75% of Europeans for whom making ends 
meet is very difficult and by 70% of unemployed 
people, compared with an EU average of 65% 
(European Commission, 2011). 
New forms of citizen self-expression 
The data on forms of civic and political 
involvement from the EQLS 2007 and 2011 
show the increasing rates of Europeans who 
engaged in political action by signing petitions, 
including electronic or online petitions. On 
average, one in every four Europeans had 
expressed their civic or political concerns at 
least once, as measured by the 2011 EQLS (see 
Figure 6). While participation in traditional 
forms of engagement that require personal 
interaction (such as attending a meeting or 
an event, or contacting a politician or an 
official) is in single digits and has dropped by 
a few percentage points since 2007, the rate of 
petition signatories has increased. 
Expressing one’s opinion through petitions 
is positively related to use of the internet for 
purposes other than work: three-quarters of 
petition signatories are daily internet users. 
The proportion of petition signatories among 
daily internet users is 27%, compared with 5% 
of non-users. This suggests that the petitions 
signed by survey respondents were by and large 
online petitions (Eurofound, 2012, p. 90).
While there may be some reservations as to 
the content and level of the commitment of 
the online community, these new data still 
bring positive messages. First, they confirm the 
current and future relevance of the citizens’ 
initiative mechanism introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty. Second, there is a gender balance among 
the petition signatories, which signifies a change 
from the traditional forms of involvement, all of 
which are characterised by slightly higher rates 
of participating men than women.
However, a lower representation of groups with 
lower educational attainment and lower income 
is apparent among those expressing themselves, 
13 / Foundation Findings: Political trust and civic engagement during the crisis
Figure 6: Rate of participation in civic and political activities, EU27 (%)
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in particular through online means. This should 
not be ignored, and a framework for various 
forms of involvement should be fostered both 
for the sake of democracy and for the sake of 
reducing exclusion in the context of the crisis.
Trust and volunteering
The EQLS shows that Europeans who volunteer 
are more likely to trust their national government 
than those who do not and that the act itself 
is more important than the frequency with 
which they volunteer. People who volunteer 
on a monthly basis for social organisations 
or political parties or trade unions are most 
trusting of their national government, scoring 
4.8 on a scale of 1 to 10, while trust is lowest, 
at 3.9, among respondents who never volunteer 
for any kind of organisation. 
As Figure 7 shows, one in three Europeans 
(32%) carried out some type of unpaid voluntary 
work in the past year. On average, 17% do it 
regularly – every week or every month. Most 
people volunteer through educational, cultural, 
sports or professional associations (18%), 
followed by community services (15%), social 
movements or charities (11%) and other types 
of organisations that may include religious ones 
(10%), and political parties and trade unions 
(5%). While most regular volunteers (that is, 
doing unpaid voluntary work every week or 
every month) are involved in a particular type 
of organisation, 5% of those who do regular 
voluntary work do so with more than one type 
of organisation.
In terms of the social profile of people involved 
in voluntary work, education and income 
play an important role, in line with findings 
in most of the literature. Almost half (48%) 
of those with tertiary education did some 
voluntary work in the 12 months prior to the 
survey, compared with less than a third (29%) 
of those with secondary education. There are 
nearly twice as many regular volunteers among 
people with tertiary education (29%) than there 
are among those with secondary education 
(15%). While education has an impact on 
income at individual level, the extent to which 
income differentiates frequency of voluntary 
14
Figure 7: Rate of participation in voluntary work, by type and frequency, EU27 (%)
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10 The 12 EU Member States that joined in 2004 and 2007.
work differs within countries. By and large in 
the EU12,10 the proportion of volunteers in 
the lowest income quartile is half  that of the 
highest income quartile (15% as against 30%). 
Corresponding figures for the lowest and highest 
income quartiles in the EU15 group of countries 
are 28% and 42%.
In the context of the effect of volunteering and 
trust (Sivesind et al, 2013), it is interesting to 
note that a significant proportion of Europeans 
hold the view that non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) can influence decision-
making at European level, with even higher 
proportions thinking that they can exert an 
influence at the national level (European 
Commission, 2013e). However, it is important 
to note that volunteering is not only about 
individual motivation, but also about framework 
conditions and infrastructure; therefore, the 
role of NGOs and opportunity structures for 
individual participation differ between Member 
States. 
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Ë Section 
Trust in political institutions has fallen 
sharply since the onset of the economic crisis. 
Unsurprisingly, this erosion of trust is most 
intense in those countries and among those 
people that have been most strongly hit by 
the crisis. What has been highlighted in this 
paper is that the crisis is affecting people’s trust 
in national governments just as much as it is 
affecting public confidence in the European 
Union, if not more so.
Unfortunately, the economic forecast does not 
show any significant improvements in the year 
up to mid-2014, which puts extra pressure on 
the EU to restore trust ahead of the European 
elections in June 2014. In line with research 
that shows that civic engagement and voting is 
linked to a combination of trust and awareness, 
the EU is currently stepping up efforts through 
the European Year of Citizens to engage with 
the public and to listen to it. This dialogue 
should be used to debate the action the EU 
should take, and a number of directions are 
suggested below.
In order to regain the trust of citizens in 
the European project through trust in key 
institutions of the European Union, the EU’s 
response to the recent declines in political trust 
should be twofold. 
Firstly, the message of what has already 
been done at European level to help national 
institutions deal with the effects and causes 
of the crisis needs to be strengthened. There 
is a need for communication activities to refute 
the portrayal of falling trust as a problem for the 
EU institutions alone and to make it clear that 
the EU has initiated a wide array of actions, 
such as the Social Investment Package, to help 
national governments get out of the crisis. The 
European Year of Citizens offers a means and a 
platform to highlight EU actions to help citizens 
combat the crisis. This need for communication 
activities is urgent, particularly in light of the 
forthcoming European Parliament elections in 
2014, where there is a risk that anti-European 
and populist parties will gain ground by blaming 
Europe for the crisis. 
Secondly, measures that increase national 
trust need to be supported. In terms of 
practical steps towards supporting recovery 
of trust in national institutions, the following 
points are important.
Î Improving the situation of vulnerable groups 
that tend to have lower political trust, such 
as the unemployed and those in financially 
precarious situations, can help to reduce 
the societal base of disenchantment. The 
 Policy pointers
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recent departure from austerity policies to a 
stronger focus on stimulating employment 
should help, particularly in stabilising trust 
among those Europeans most affected 
by the crisis. Using the Europe 2020 
framework, the EU is in a position to 
facilitate Member States in learning from 
each other about what measures work best 
to stimulate growth, create jobs and reduce 
social exclusion.
Î To maintain or raise the political trust of 
citizens, attention should not be limited 
to politics and political institutions alone; 
the good performance of a set of key public 
services should be ensured. It should 
be noted that this does not necessarily 
mean higher spending but may require 
improving equality in access, transparency 
in management, and other aspects of overall 
institutional performance.
Î To target the development of institutional 
capacities and improve public service 
delivery, a more thorough monitoring of 
institutional performance is necessary 
since trust in political institutions may be 
related to performance of a broader set of 
public institutions delivering key services to 
society. 
New ways of interacting with citizens must be 
developed to gain the support of the public, 
which in turn will strengthen the legitimacy of 
EU institutions.
Î The increasing accessibility of information 
and communication technologies for civic 
and political self-expression suggests that 
boosting citizen engagement, including voter 
participation, requires looking at new ways 
of listening to citizens. It is no longer only 
the youngest Europeans who express their 
views on public issues through the internet 
and social media. However, it should be 
remembered that social media is also a 
popular avenue for voicing anti-European 
opinions; the content of the message and 
the value of the reasoning counts as much 
as the medium itself.
Î In addition to exploring and exploiting 
modern communication channels and new 
forms of political participation, the research 
presented in this policy brief points to the 
potential benefits of direct involvement, 
such as volunteering, when it comes to 
raising awareness. Furthermore, research 
also shows that through volunteering people 
encounter well-functioning institutions (in 
fields where public sector and voluntary 
organisations come together), and this 
experience increases their institutional trust. 
The EU could gain by developing policies 
that improve opportunities for people to 
engage in dialogue and action, including 
volunteering. 
Î European NGOs can play a role in 
supporting and developing new forms 
and mechanisms of consultation and 
engagement across European countries. 
Numerous voluntary organisations operate 
across Europe in social policy sectors, such 
as Coface in the field of family welfare, 
Eurochild in the area of child well-being 
or Cecodhas in the area of housing. These 
organisations exchange knowledge and 
share best practices across Member States, 
call for greater cooperation between Member 
States and promote awareness of EU policy 
in their respective fields. By being involved 
in these types of organisations, volunteers 
become aware of the role of the EU and 
the functioning of its institutions, which, 
according to the research, should have a 
positive impact on trust and consequently 
on political engagement. 
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Ë Annex
Table A1: Trust in national government and in the EU by country
EQLS Eurobarometer
Average trust in national 
government 
(1–10)
Percentage tending 
to trust their national 
government
Percentage tending to 
trust the EU
Country 2011
Difference 
2007
2011
Difference 
2007
2011
Difference 
2007
Greece 2.09 – 2.68 8% – 33 29% – 34
Spain 3.67 – 1.79 16% – 36 30% – 35
Romania 2.52 – 1.78 10% – 9 50% – 15
Cyprus 3.64 – 1.77 29% – 35 47% – 14
Slovakia 3.17 – 1.73 21% – 21 48% – 18
Slovenia 2.83 – 1.38 12% – 24 38% – 30
Portugal 3.19 – 1.09 24% – 22 31% – 34
Estonia 4.47 – 1.02 49% – 17 51% – 21
Austria 4.75 – 1.01 46% – 11 34% – 12
France 4.02 – 1.01 21% – 15 30% – 21
Lithuania 2.98 – 0.96 18% – 8 50% – 15
Ireland 3.91 – 0.94 22% – 19 24% – 30
Denmark 5.71 – 0.93 42% – 25 50% – 15
Italy 3.01 – 0.88 12% – 25 32% – 26
Belgium 4.46 – 0.60 34% – 28 50% – 23
Netherlands 5.40 – 0.54 45% – 28 42% – 27
Finland 6.11 – 0.52 56% – 19 44% – 17
Malta 4.95 – 0.48 27% – 24 41% – 25
Czech Republic 3.27 – 0.43 15% – 12 38% – 23
Luxembourg 6.52 – 0.23 68% 2 47% – 15
Poland 3.46 – 0.03 28% 10 47% – 21
UK 4.35 0.01 21% – 14 17% – 19
Germany 4.90 0.06 32% – 17 30% – 26
Croatia* 4.19 0.16 30% – 10 51% – 15
Hungary 3.55 0.22 26% – 1 47% – 14
Sweden 6.04 0.30 61% 6 43% – 13
Bulgaria 3.55 0.34 38% 16 59% 5
Latvia 3.05 0.46 19% – 1 40% – 7
* EQLS 2012; the EQLS was conducted in the 27 EU Member States in 2011 and in seven of the nine countries engaged in the 
enlargement process in 2012, including Croatia, which subsequently became a Member State in July 2013.
Note: Figures shown in red indicate the lowest level of trust or the greatest decline in trust in the EU.
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‘I cannot emphasise this enough: citizens will not be convinced with 
rhetoric and promises only, but only with a concrete set of common 
achievements. We have to show the many areas where Europe has 
solved problems for citizens. Europe is not the cause of problems, 
Europe is part of the solution.
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European 
Commission, State of the Union address, 2013
